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1The illusions, reality, and implications of British government expenditure 1948-1968
CARLO MORELLI
Abstract
This article presents unique industry level data on the level of government purchases
from private industry. Utilising input-output data for the years 1948, 1963 and 1968
the paper highlights the importance of government as a consumer for private firms.
Government as a consumer is shown to have been most significant for industries that
also had high levels of industrial concentration and exports. The article provides an
explanation for the government business relationship which is at odds with the
bargaining environment approach. The article concludes that the government business
relationship from the end of the Second World War onwards was contextualised by co-
operation and integration rather than bargaining.
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CARLO MORELLI
Government and its impact upon economic growth has always played a major
role in explanations of British economic development.2 The extension of government’s
influence on the private economy in the twentieth century has ensured government lies
at the heart of explanations of relative economic decline. From highly influential
popular writers including Barnett and Hutton to more serious academic studies
including Broadberry and Crafts, Cairncross, Middleton, Phelps-Brown and Tomlinson
the role of British government policy and expenditure continues to play an important
yet disputed part in these debates.3
One of the central assumptions within much of this literature is that public
expenditure is independent of, and exogenous to, the growth of the private sector. The
British state has been portrayed as diverting scarce resources into non-economic
activities and, or, incapable of developing the modernising incentive structures capable
of halting relative economic decline.4 Indeed the most important recent study of
government expenditure takes as its title ‘Government versus the market’ thus
counterposing of non-market hierarchies and markets as methods of organisation. In
contrast this article aims to demonstrate the growing integration and inter-dependence
between government and business.
Using officially published National Income and Expenditure Tables section
two reviews the growth of public expenditure while section three presents new data
based upon early input-output studies, covering the years from 1948 to 1968, to
3examine the sectoral importance of government as a consumer for private industry.
The data presents evidence that total public expenditure (combined government
authorities and public corporations) provided core markets for firms across a wide and
diversifying set of private industries within the economy. The importance of this
growing integration between government and British private industry is then examined
in section four within the context of debates over the under-performance of the post
war British economy. It is suggested that the emergence of a state capitalist merging of
interests between public and private sectors is ignored by both the over-profligate
welfare state and ineffective developmental state emphases currently underpinning
much of the bargaining literature. Finally the article concludes that the economic
history of postwar Britain can only be fully understood by integrating this increasing
inter-dependence between public and private sectors within the historiography.
II
While the growth of total public expenditure as a proportion of total output has
been well documented measurement problems create significant difficulties in
interpreting the results.5  Middleton’s summary of this growth between 1937 and 1968
is reproduced in Table 1.
Table 1. Total Public Expenditure as a percentage of GDP at current market prices, by
economic category
Economic Category 1937
%
1948
%
1951
%
1955
%
1960
%
1964
%
1968
%
Current goods and
services
11.7 15.0 16.8 16.6 16.3 16.4 17.8
Gross capital
formation
3.3 5.7 6.9 7.6 7.3 9.0 10.8
Current grants to
personal sector
5.0 6.0 5.4 5.8 6.5 7.2 8.5
Subsidies 0.6 4.9 3.2 1.8 1.9 1.6 2.1
4Current grants paid
abroad
0.1 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4
Debt interest 5.4 5.1 4.7 4.8 4.6 4.2 4.4
Total 26.0 37.0 37.5 37.0 37.1 38.9 43.9
Source: Middleton, Government, tab. 3.2.
The degree to which government has apparently grown may simply be due two
forms of measurement error. As the service sector has grown, especially with the
increase in non-traded services in advanced economies, it has been recognised that
measurements of GNP have become ‘more and more problematical’ due to the
difficulty of assigning market prices to services.6 Second, government expenditure
itself is exacerbated by the impact of relative price effects. Purchases, particularly
within the defence and high technology sectors, where greater uncertainty exists in
research and development are prone to more rapid price inflation than marketed goods
while government services, particularly within welfare provision, typically involve high
labour costs relative to total costs leaving limited opportunity for productivity growth.7
As a result while government expenditure on goods and services may have increased
by 910% between 1962 and 1981 at current prices when measured in constant prices
the increase is reduced to 33%. Heald suggests that the only ‘safe’ conclusion to draw
is that it has been price inflation rather than an increase in volume that has been the
dominant influence in rising public expenditure.8
Although Table 1 highlights a relative stability in total public expenditure in the
period from 1948-64 it also demonstrates a redistribution of expenditure towards gross
capital formation and current goods and services after 1948. Expenditure leading to
increases in gross capital formation was dominated by local government expenditure,
accounting for as much as 90 per cent of expenditure in 1954 but more typically
around three-quarters of expenditure in the 1950s. Expenditure on current goods and
5services was concentrated within central government, typically accounting for around
three-quarters of this expenditure throughout the 1950s.9 The importance of the
growth of these two areas, as will be seen below, was the creation of large centralised
markets for private industry.
Further functional classification of public expenditure has been made by
Middleton and is reproduced in Table 2. The provision of social services had been, and
continued to be, the single most important outlet for public expenditure growing from
40 per cent to 46 per cent of total public expenditure between 1937 and 1968.
However, this expenditure was not, as is usually implied, wholly transfer payments.
Instead, spending on social services contained a significant level of expenditure on
goods and services as well as capital formation, both of which involved private
industry. By examining data for 1958, a year when the National Income and
Expenditure Tables were reconciled with the Census of Production, and are believed
to be at their most accurate,10 we can see that 68 per cent of expenditure on housing
was unrelated to wages and salaries, subsidies, grants or changes to values of stocks.
In health and in education the comparable figures are 53 per cent and 34 per cent
respectively.11 Unfortunately, National Income and Expenditure Tables are unable to
provide further detail on this expenditure. Interestingly, Table 2 also provides further
information on expenditure beyond social services. Outside of debt interest payments,
the most important areas for public expenditure are economic services and defence.
The most significant elements of expenditure within economic services are
those related to agriculture, forestry and fishing, transport and communication, and
other industry and trade, including civil nuclear energy.12 Subsidies to agriculture,
amounting to £272 million in 1958, accounting for over 83 per cent of government
6expenditure on agriculture and food, was the most significant element of expenditure
on economic services.13 The importance of subsidies for the continuation of the
agricultural industry at this time should not be overlooked. In 1947 the Lucas Report
questioned the use of price capping and subsidies as a mechanism for maximising farm
output. In 1948 this led to a limit being placed upon farm subsidies of £465m.14 A
decade later, despite subsidies falling in real terms, the Treasury maintained that Britain
had the most highly protected agricultural industry in Europe with subsidies amounting to
‘50% of gross agricultural product, or rather value added’.15 Elsewhere some 89 per cent
of expenditure on transport and communications and 59 per cent of expenditure on
other industry and trade was used outside of wages and salaries, subsidies, grants or
changes to values of stocks.16
Table 2. Final Public Expenditure 1937-68 as a percentage of GDP, by functional
classification.
Functional Category 1937
%
1948
%
1951
%
1955
%
1960
%
1964
%
1968
%
Social services 10.5 17.6 14.1 13.9 15.1 16.5 20.2
Debt interest 5.4 5.1 4.7 4.8 4.6 4.2 4.4
Defence 4.9 6.3 7.6 8.0 6.3 6.1 5.6
Economic services 2.7 4.8 7.1 6.2 6.9 7.1 7.8
Public administration 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9
Law and order 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9
External services 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.7
Environmental
services
0.9 1.3 1.7 1.9 1.9 2.5 3.4
Total 26.0 37.0 37.5 37.0 37.1 38.9 43.9
Source: Middleton, Government, tab. 3.2.
It is clear that our understanding of government expenditure requires an
investigation beyond the aggregate data. Whether it was in the provision of social
7services or economic services, the growth of public expenditure cannot simply be
discussed in a context of the growth of transfer payments, their distributional impact,
or the incentive effects of marginal taxation rates. Neither can government expenditure
on current goods and services be simply understood as government acting as
‘employer of last resort’.17 Instead public expenditure, even in the provision of welfare,
represented the largest single market for private industry. Under these circumstances
private industry required close collaboration with national and local government,
nationalised industries and the plethora of purchasing departments.
The most commonly recognised area in which private and public interest
merged was in defence expenditure. Of the major western economies only the United
States spent more on defence (as a proportion of GDP) than Britain after 1945.18
Although defence expenditure in Britain peaked in 1952, following the outbreak of the
Korean War, and declined continually in real terms throughout the 1950s and 1960s
Britain remained a high spending nation. While there is again no consensus over the
impact on economic growth of high defence expenditure, a pessimistic view remains
strong. Defence expenditure shifted research and development investment and science
graduates towards capital intensive, military related technologies, with little
opportunity for civilian spin-off.19 In the process firms and whole industries saw the
defence sector as their core market. By 1962, ten years after real defence expenditure
peaked, military orders were estimated to account for at least 65 per cent, and
probably 70 per cent, of the aircraft industry’s output.20 Within the electronics industry
at least 22 per cent of total output was destined for military purposes. As much of this
was concentrated within the industrial and radio communications sub-sectors, the
proportion was likely to be at least 35 per cent of total production in these sub-
8sectors.21 In shipbuilding estimates of military orders suggest over 23 per cent of total
output was accounted for by defence expenditure.22 The close relationship between
public expenditure and the growth of the defence sector has been a focus for Edgerton
who has argued that the warfare-state dimension of the postwar settlement needs to be
recognised. At its peak government was probably responsible for directly employing
over one and a half million workers in the defence industry.23 The postwar political
consensus that emerged after 1945 was constructed around an industrial/military nexus
based upon high technology and high defence expenditure.24 This linkage between state
and arms manufacturers was such that major arms contractors had become among the
largest private firms in the country.  As Edgerton notes ‘nine out of the top fifty
employers in 1955 were major defence contractors, each employing between 21,000
and 75,000 workers’.25 Kidron and later Binns point to the importance of an
international, permanent arms economy as a mechanism for introducing economic
stability among the major world powers as an explanation for both the high growth
rates and duration of the golden age.26 Finally, Freeman maintains that government
funding of research and development requires a 'considerable reorientation’ away from
military and prestige projects in order to establish a framework conducive to
establishing more competitive industries.27
It has not previously been possible to quantify the degree to which the defence
sector was representative of private industry’s relationship to government as a whole.
It is extremely difficult to ascertain the extent of non-military public expenditure on
individual industries since the use of National Income and Expenditure Tables, as the
primary source of data, prevents much further investigation into government
expenditure. Fortunately, in the Input-Output Tables for the United Kingdom there is
9another set of official publications which provides further industry level data on
government expenditure.
III
Input-output tables derive from wartime governments’ interests in economic
management and the work of economists such as Leontief in the 1930s on the
interdependence of industries within economies.28 Input-output tables describe the flow of
goods and services between industrial sectors within an economy and are based upon, and
reconciled with, Census of Production and National Accounts.29 The need to understand
the impact of increases in output from individual sectors upon the economy as a whole, led
to their use by the US military during the Second World War and their widespread use after
1945. Input-output tables were used as planning mechanisms during the reconstruction
period in Norway, the Netherlands and Italy, and became still more widely used among
developing nations following the spread of government inspired development
programmes.30
Detailed input-output tables on Britain in the two decades after 1945 exist for the
years 1948, 1954, 1963, and 1968.31 The 1948 tables were published by researchers at the
Department of Applied Economics, Cambridge in 1958 while those covering 1954, 1963,
and 1968 were published by Central Statistical Office in 1961, 1970, and 1973
respectively.32 The Input-Output tables for 1948 provide an industry x industry matrix dis-
aggregated into 47 industry groups using the 1950 Census of Production categorisation,
while the tables for 1963 provide dis-aggregated industry x industry data within 70 industry
classifications using the 1963 Census of Production and the 1968 tables use a 90 industry
classification based upon the 1968 Census of Production.33
10
By calculating the total purchases of intermediate products by the nationalised
industries from each industry group and final product purchases by central and local
government, and then measuring this against the total domestic sales of each industry, it is
possible to ascertain how important public sector orders were on an industry by industry
basis (see Appendix for methodology).
Tables 3, 4 & 5 highlight the diversity of public sector purchases across private
industries for 1948, 1963, and 1968 while Table 6 provides a summary table of the
importance of public expenditure (excluding capital expenditure) to a growing range of
industries, accounting for at least 10 per cent of total domestic output.34 This is consistent
with the evidence from National Income and Expenditure Tables and indicates that
government was increasingly becoming integrated into the whole of the British
manufacturing sector as the period developed.
In the case of the aircraft industry, public sector orders were almost entirely
responsible for the survival of the industry. By the late 1960s in heavy mechanical and high
technology industries, including the shipbuilding, locomotive building, pharmaceutical, and
other mining and quarrying (providing inputs into the gas industry) the public sector was
absorbing half, or more, of all domestic output. These findings are consistent with our
knowledge of the importance of military expenditure for the aircraft and shipbuilding
industries and with the broad estimates made in 1949 by the Lemon Committee that
around 30 per cent of engineering products not exported were purchased by the public
sector.35 Further support for these results can be found from Richardson, writing in 1969
on behalf of the British Electrical Manufacturers’ Association, who points to the heavy
electrical industry’s virtual complete reliance upon nationalised industries for orders.36 In
pharmaceuticals the 1956 official government report into the National Health Service
11
stated that one-third of sales of the industry went to the National Health Service which
Reekie suggests has remained consistent throughout the life of the NHS.37 For other new
technology industries, including radio and telecommunications and scientific instrument
industries, the public sector accounted for as much as 40 per cent of domestic orders by the
early 1960s. This again finds backing from Sciberras who notes of the semiconductor
industry in the 1970s that the ‘state and military markets still account for a substantial
share of UK firms sales’.38 For a wider range of industries outside of the heavy mechanical
engineering sector, including the mineral oil (and manufactured fuels in 1968), wires and
cables, rubber, small arms and general mechanical engineering industries, the public sector
again represented a key market with around a fifth of total demand. Below this the public
sector was a major market, responsible for over 10 per cent of domestic orders, across a
diverse range of industries including chemicals (dyestuffs, explosives, polishes, and allied
industries and soaps and detergents), precision and mechanical engineering (small tools,
machine tools, industrial engines, and wire manufacturer), electrical engineering (domestic
appliances, electrical machinery, and other electrical goods) paper and printing (printing and
publishing, paper, board, and wood), and even household textiles.
Only within the electrical engineering and mineral oil sectors does there appear to
be any consistent and significant decline in the importance of the public sector, suggesting
that the public sector was of major importance prior to the emergence of large domestic
markets for many electrical goods or oil based products.
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Table 6. Government Current Expenditure Purchases from Private Manufacturing
Industry as a Proportion of Domestic Output for 1948, 1963 and 1968.a
1948
%
1963
%
1968
%
Aircraft 77 80 93
Locomotives, railway equipment & other vehicles 17 42 60
Motors & cycles 25
Shipbuilding & marine engineering 13 43 49
Pharmaceuticals b 10 26 58
Other mining and quarrying 52
Electronics and telecommunications c 39 26
Instrument engineering d 12 36 18
Mineral oil refining e 54 26 18
(Coke ovens & manufactured fuels) (14)
Insulated wires & cables 25 28
Rubber 22 20
Ordnance, small arms, general mechanical
engineering & other mechanical engineering
17 17
Chemicals, lubricating oils, dyestuffs, explosives,
polishes & allied industries f
17 10 14
Engineers small tools 11 14
Household textiles and handkerchiefs 14
Other manufacturing 11 13
Wood & cork g 13 13
Industrial engines 12 11
Domestic appliances 14 10
(Other electrical goods) (10)
Electrical machinery 14 10
Soaps and detergents 12
Printing & publishing 11
Wire and wire manufacture 11
Construction materials 10
Machine tools 10
a
 Notes: Figures show only industries where sales exceed 10 per cent of gross domestic
output.
b
 Pharmaceuticals & toilet preparations in 1963
c
 Radio & telecommunications in 1963
d
 Scientific instruments in 1963
e
 Oils & greases in 1948
18
f 
 Other chemical industries in 1968
g
 Other paper & board in 1968
Sources: Stewart, ‘Input-output’, pp.vii-ix; Input-output, 1963, tabs. A & D; Input-output,
1968, tabs. D & P.
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Before we can assess the importance of these findings for our understanding of the
wider economic history of postwar Britain we need to answer two further questions. First,
to what extent can these results be considered to be accurate? Second, how much of the
apparent spread of public sector expenditure across a widening group of industries is simply
a product of the increasing complexity of the Census of Production categorisation?
As documented above, the secondary sources available, although often only
giving broad estimates, do appear to correspond with the results from input-output
tables. The tables above, therefore, represent the most accurate and detailed industry
level results available to date. More importantly the significance of government as a
market for individual industrial sectors reported in Table 6 are almost certainly
minimum levels of importance due to the ignoring of expenditure leading to increases
in gross domestic capital formation. Finally, there will be a further tendency for the
increase of government’s importance to be under-estimated due to the treatment of
imports in the 1948 tables and exclusion of some areas of public expenditure from the
estimates (see Appendix ).
However, one question arising, particularly from Table 6 is whether or not the
increasing number of industries reported is simply a product of greater differentiation
within the industrial classifications. Table 7 makes clear that the increase of
government orders lies not in changes in the classifications used by the Census of
Production but in the genuine growth of public sector's importance across an
increasing number of industries during the 1950s and 1960s. In particular, the growth
of government’s importance lay within the plant and machinery and the vehicles, ships
and aircraft sectors of the economy.
Table 7. Public Sector Orders as a Percentage of Total Domestic Output 1948-68.
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1948
%
1963
%
1968
%
Plant and
Machinery
11.2 24.2 22.2
Vehicles, Ships and
Aircraft
33.7 38.1 40.5
Construction 49.0 49.0 55.8
Sources: Stewart, ‘Input-output’, pp.vii-ix; Input-output, 1963, tabs. 9, A & D; Input-
output, 1968, tabs. D & P National Income, 1955, tab. 51 and, 1969, tab. 52
IV
That the British government was responsible for half of all construction over two
decades is relatively well known. The postwar house building programmes followed by
large-scale motorway construction projects ensured governments' role in the construction
industry would be significant.39 In contrast however the level of government involvement in
manufacturing is neither less well known nor accepted and requires discussion.
Government expenditure has typically been understood in two ways. Neo-
classically influenced writers have understood government expenditure as distorting market
signals and crowding-out investment opportunities within the market sector. The provision
of free goods and services is said to increase X-inefficiency since consumption will occur
despite marginal benefit being lower than marginal cost, leading to allocative inefficiency.40
Nowhere has this been more clearly expressed than in the two-sector model described by
Bacon & Eltis. For Bacon and Eltis non-market expenditure represents unproductive
expenditure in non-traded sectors and extracts scarce resources out of a productive,
traded sector.41 This view implies that unless outputs from public expenditure are sold
in the marketplace public expenditure represents a drain upon an economy’s limited
resources.42 As Bacon and Eltis explain it is ‘the public sector activities which do not
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provide marketed outputs that put particular pressure on the resources of the
remainder of the economy’.43 In their view growing public expenditure creates a crisis
in which private investment is crowded out by an ever-increasing public sector. In
reality Bacon & Eltis not only overstate the scale of the government sector but also fail
to recognise the degree to which government activity in the provision of public goods
acts to reduce market failure.
It is precisely in the area of government expenditure reducing the potential for
market failure and hence encouraging allocative efficiency that the challenge to neo-
classical ideas has been rooted.44 Where externalities are derived from consumption,
market mechanisms will lead to under provision. Individual marginal benefit will equate
to individual marginal cost at an equilibrium below the equilibrium achieved for social
benefit equating to social cost. Under these circumstances it is only through the
provision of public goods that an optimal outcome and allocative efficiency at an
aggregate level will be achieved.45 Our understanding of postwar government
expenditure has developed within this framework relating to debates over the
importance and effectiveness of Keynesian macroeconomic demand management
acting to reduce market failure. Keynes explanation for persistent interwar
unemployment centred on the view that in the absence of a proactive government
policy a stable equilibrium could emerge at a level below full employment. Through
employment generating public works programmes, multiplier effects could increase
aggregate demand to a new and higher stable level.46 Thus the relationship between
government expenditure and private industry was established through an indirect
multiplier effect.
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Assessments of the impact of Keynesian approach have been mixed. Cairncross
emphasises the constraints under which government operated and apologetically
suggests that ‘it is not unreasonable to conclude that the influence of government
policy on the underlying rate of growth in an industrial economy is of less consequence
than is popularly supposed’.47 Matthews in explaining the existence of full-employment
has questioned whether governments actually utilised Keynesian ideas of monetary
injections and multiplier effects to raise aggregate demand at all.48
While rejecting the Bacon and Eltis model other neo-classically influenced
rational choice views have focused upon the distorting price signals created by the
growth of government expenditure. An implicit postwar ‘social contract’ between
labour, government, and employers in which a commitment to high welfare
expenditure acting as a quid-pro-quo for government’s minimalist approach to
competition policy within the private sector reduced competitive pressures.49 Thus
Broadberry and Crafts, while accepting the short-term benefits of the postwar
consensus, maintain that the ‘postwar settlement and gradualist approach to the
transition from war to peace had costs in terms of forgone productivity’.50 The long-
term result, in the British case, was an institutionalisation of weak incentive structures
reducing the adoption of important changes required for more rapid productivity
growth.51 Further, in the absence of mechanisms for the destruction of institutional
limitations, upon growth, sub-optimal choices that increase X-inefficiency could
nevertheless appear rational. Eichengreen maintains that under such circumstances
market failure occurs due to co-ordination problems with actors unable to establish
markets to satisfy either latent demand or supply. One example is the, apparent, failure
to develop managerial capitalism due to firms’ inability to gain access to capital for
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investment, caused by imperfect capital markets. This in turn was a product of the
continuing strength of family firms preventing the emergence of sophisticated capital
markets.52 A damaging circularity became established in which distributional coalitions
and cosy postwar deals restricted possibilities of growth and instead produced
economic sclerosis.53 Finally, while this view accepts that the growth of government
expenditure ‘alone’ was not to blame, a willingness to replace market with non-market
relationships ensured that the costs involved in government intervention, through the
continuation of rent-seeking activity by distributional coalitions, remained hidden from
consumers.54
Within this bargaining environment framework, accounts more sympathetic to
the growth of government emphasise government’s response to market failure and
pragmatic responses to the impact of the Second World War. The limited success of
rationalisation plans during the interwar period, with the coal industry being the
primary example, and a lack of investment though the war, made nationalisation almost
inevitable.55 Within the network industries, government intervention led to a ‘national
unified framework with a public purpose’ which prevented abuse of power within
natural monopolies.56  Government has still been criticised but now it is either too
weakly interventionist or unable to overcome private sector opposition.57 Thus Chick
notes that the government faced ‘strong local opposition which could not be cajoled
into submission’ when it attempted to rationalise the private steel industry before
nationalisation in 1951.58 Similarly, in their explanation of a low productivity
consensus, Booth, Melling, and Dartmann have maintained that a failure to create a
‘productivity coalition’ after 1945 derived from an inability of the British state to
develop proactive policies.59 While Britain, arguably, was best placed to promote local
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and national productivity coalitions, a commitment to liberal and reactive traditions
ensured the state refused to ‘persuade, threat, or even coerce institutions into a co-
operative bargain and to develop the machinery of co-ordination that consolidates such
bargains.’60
From differing viewpoints the influence of rational choice theories has placed
the establishment of weak bargaining environments at the heart of explanations of
British postwar relative economic decline. Yet such an approach assumes government
and business were at odds in a bargaining environment and misses entirely the very
high degree of integration that clearly existed. Government’s perceived failure of
industrial policy in postwar Britain is seen as an inability to achieve increasing growth
rates through bargaining. Yet government was clearly aware of its importance for the
continued profitability of private industry and was prepared to ensure that government
policy was designed to defend the interests of private industry. In so doing it would not
challenge the validity of private industry's view of what those 'interests' were. In
essence then government readily accepted the need to defend exiting property rights
and private industry's 'right to manage'.
An examination of the pharmaceutical industry highlights this point most
clearly. The Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the Cost of the National Health
Service, 1956, was established to find mechanisms to prevent the continued rise in the
cost of health provision. While the report was critical that its investigation was
'hampered by a lack of information' from the pharmaceutical industry and that it could
find  'no complete and satisfying explanation' for the rising cost of the drug bill it did in
fact reach a number of conclusions.61 The committee concluded that while the NHS
'was a very large buyer of these [pharmaceutical] products (in some instances virtually
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the sole buyer) .. it is clearly right that the taxpayer should have a voice, through the
Departments administering the Service, in the prices which are to be paid.’ It was also
accepted that ’account has to be taken of the present position and future development
of the pharmaceutical industry in this country.’62 Within a year, government and the
pharmaceutical industry had established the Voluntary Price Regulation Scheme to
regulate first manufacturers’ proprietary products and later generic drug prices.63
Importantly, then government perceived its role as consumer in two ways. First as
regulator of oligopolistic profit maximising and second as a financier of last resort to
strategic industries. Yet in its financing role it continued to take a passive stance.
More generally, both the Lemon and Lucas committees in the late 1940s had
reported on government’s importance to the electrical manufacturing and agricultural
sectors. Monopolies and Restrictive Practice Commission reports throughout the
1950s emphasised the extent of collusion and price fixing among private firms and the
detrimental affects this had on both private and public consumers. Not until the late
1950s can government be said to begin to utilise its importance as a consumer to
actively promote rationalisation among specific industries, including the aircraft
industry.64 In the 1960s the National Economic Development Council and later the
Industrial Reorganisation Corporation were established to further promote
productivity growth and rationalisation by encouraging mergers and concentration
within a wider range of industries, including cars and electrical engineering.
Government’s failure it can be concluded lay not in an inadequate awareness of
their relative position as the largest consumer of goods and services within the
economy but in an unwillingness to utilise that position to the full and instead to readily
accept the view of business where conflicts emerged.
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An explanation of why government failed to undertake a more proactive
industrial policy can be found in a more detailed examination of its contracting
relationship with industry. Table 8 shows five firm employment concentration ratios for
the industries reported in Table 6 for the year 1968.  Estimates of average aggregate
concentration ratios indicate five firm concentration accounted for almost 45% of
employment in 1968.65
Table 8. Government Current Expenditure Purchases from Private Manufacturing
Industry and five firm concentration ratios in 1968.
% of
domestic
sales to
government
5 firm
concentration
ratios a
Aircraft 93 72
Locomotives, railway equipment & other vehicles 60 83-96
Shipbuilding & marine engineering 49 52
Pharmaceuticals 58 39
Other mining and quarrying 52 70
Electronics and telecommunications 26 44-92
Mineral oil refining 18 44-88
Insulated wires & cables 28 82
Instrument engineering 18 23-81
Ordnance, small arms, general mechanical
engineering & other mechanical engineering
17 29-80
Chemicals, lubricating oils, dyestuffs, explosives,
polishes & allied industries
14 52-89
Engineers small tools 14 17
Household textiles and handkerchiefs 14 20
Other manufacturing 13 17-65
Wood & cork 13 38-41
Industrial engines 11 88
Domestic appliances
(Other electrical goods)
14
10
48
47
Electrical machinery 10 57
Soaps and detergents 12 69
Wire and wire manufacture 11 34
Note: a range refers to combinations of minimum list headings.
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Sources: Input-output 1968, tabs. D & P, Hart and Clark, Concentration, tab. 2C.1
As can be seen from the table government orders were of greater importance
for those industries which had higher than average concentration ratios. Industries
which relied upon government for over a quarter or more of their domestic sales were
likely to have a concentration ratio up to twice the average for all industry.
Government contracting was thus typically with larger oligopolistic, if not
monopolistic firms. One estimate suggests that large firms won 75 per cent of
government orders.66 Under these circumstances economic ideas of perfect
competition involving atomistic firms as price-takers were irrelevant and pricing
regulation, through voluntary agreements, such as the one operating for
pharmaceuticals, or cost plus contracting, such as in defence and electrical engineering,
emerged.67 Here then lies the problem government faced in promoting efficiency and
rationalisation. Government influence as a consumer to promote concentration and
rationalisation was limited because its orders were focused on industries which were
themselves already highly concentrated.
In other areas of industrial policy too the importance of big business and its
linkages to government has been recognised. Mercer points out, large firms readily
accepted and promoted a more stringent competition policy from 1956 onwards.
Mercer emphasises the role played by large firms in the changing approach to
competition policy. She suggests that ‘business views reigned supreme’ and
government responded to rather than challenged these views. In particular it was
transnational companies which sought a less restricted domestic market.68 The
importance of government orders for large private firms was that it was exactly these
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orders which were unaffected by the introduction of competition policy. The reality of
the contracting relationship was one of a government monopsonist facing oligopolistic
(and even monopolistic) producers and it was suggested, with little exaggeration,
‘Buggins turn’ was used by manufacturers as a method of allocating public sector
contracts.69 Thus a small number of large firms negotiated with government, and each
other, over orders which were, in the main, protected from international competition.
This close relationship provided large firms with the flexibility to allow for an
abandonment of collusive agreements. Simultaneously the increasing acceptance of
GATT and consequent opening up of international markets ensured large firms were
also able to enter into new international markets.
The results from the input-output data provide further evidence for this. Table
9 highlights the relationship between industries reliant upon government for domestic
orders and those industries with high levels of exports as a proportion of total output.
Table 9. Government Current Expenditure Purchases from Private Manufacturing
Industry and proportion of exports as a percentage of total output in 1968.
% of domestic
sales to
government
Exports as
a %  of
total output
Aircraft 93 35
Locomotives, railway equipment & other vehicles 60 26
Shipbuilding & marine engineering 49 26
Pharmaceuticals 58 33
Other mining and quarrying 52 16
Electronics and telecommunications 26 22
Mineral oil refining 18 20
Insulated wires & cables 28 16
Instrument engineering 18 31
Ordnance, small arms, general mechanical
engineering & other mechanical engineering
17 18
Chemicals, lubricating oils, dyestuffs, explosives,
polishes & allied industries
14 28
29
Engineers small tools 14 20
Household textiles and handkerchiefs 14 13
Other manufacturing 13 29
Wood & cork 13 8
Industrial engines 11 48
Domestic appliances
(Other electrical goods)
14
10
16
15
Electrical machinery 10 20
Soaps and detergents 12 13
Wire and wire manufacture 11 16
Sources: Input-Output 1968, tab D & P.
While exports accounted for 7% of total output in 1968 it is clear that in
manufacturing sectors with a high proportion of domestic sales going to the public sector
export markets were also more significant. Industries such as defence and pharmaceuticals
were not unique in utilising large protected domestic orders to enhance their export
competitiveness.
V
This article has presented a much more detailed quantitative picture of
government’s role within the private economy than has previously been available. It has
been maintained that the influence of rational choice and bargaining environment
theories within the current historiography is too simplistic, characterising government
as open to institutional capture by rent-seeking private industry and/or incapable of
developing the proactive policies required by a more developmental modernising state.
Instead the article has argued that the state capitalist integration of the state (not
simply government) and capital after 1945 was far more extensive than the bargaining
approach recognises. As Harris notes of the period after 1945 ‘the boundaries between
30
public and private ... were becoming increasingly unclear. In the complexity of the
inter-relationships, it was difficult to detect which was which, and not at all clear that
detection served any useful purpose’ and as Miliband similarly argues ‘wherever the
state "intervenes", there also, ... will businessmen be found to influence and even
determine the nature of that intervention.’70 This linkage has also been recognised
outside of Marxist writing, with Grant suggesting that since the mid-1970s Britain has
displayed the characteristics of a ‘company state’ in which a direct connection between
government and industry has been the favoured option.71
In conclusion it is apparent that using input-output data we are able to
develop a much more nuanced discussion of the development of relationships between
the private and public sectors. Instead of developing a conflictual bargaining
arrangement government and private industry consistently co-operated in the creation
and re-creation of an economic environment conducive to large firms. Industrial policy
was based upon the interests of large firms and particular sectors of the economy.
Large firms benefited twice from the changes in postwar ideas on government’s
economic role. Not simply did they benefit from the growth of government as the
economy’s largest consumer but they also benefited from the growth of protected
markets within a framework of reduced tariffs to international trade.
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Appendix
The Theory of Input-Output Tables
This appendix provides a brief outline of methods used in creating tables 3, 4, 5 and
7.72 The essential conceptual aspect of input-output tables is the recognition that all
transactions represent a sale and a  purchase, whose value is the same by either method of
measuring.73 Thus input-output tables use an industry x industry flow matrix to show the
dis-aggregated value of purchases of intermediate goods and services between industries.
Their initial development assumed a closed economy in which all goods and services were
purchased and consumed within a given time span. In reality production is not a static
process. Economies are not closed, goods and services are internationally traded, and
output is not always used within a given time span; instead output can lead to increases in
domestic fixed capital formation or increases in stocks and work in progress. As a result,
input-output tables in practice measure the flow of intermediary products between
industries. Final output is simply presented in aggregate form with the only distinction made
between exports, final consumption (consumers and government), and output leading to
increases in gross domestic capital formation (fixed and stocks). Most importantly then,
input-output tables do not tell us which industries are making the capital investment nor
what the inter-relationships are.
Tables 3, 4 and 5 were created by aggregating all purchases from the public sector
and calculating these results as a proportion of total domestic output. Defining ‘the public
sector’ is not, however, as straightforward as might be assumed. The coal, gas, water, and
electricity supply industries are distinguished within the input-output tables for all three sets
of tables.74 The communications industry, principally the post office, is distinguished within
the 1963 and 1968 tables. The road and railway industries present some problems. In the
32
1948 and 1968 tables they are treated separately but in the 1963 tables they are combined.
In 1948 both industries were the subject of nationalisation but the road haulage industry
was subsequently privatised in the 1950s. Therefore the 1963 combined category for road
and rail transport includes a significant level of private industry. As a result the calculations
for 1963 have been run both with and without the road and railway industry data.
Excluding the road and rail transport category makes an impact in four areas: rubber
purchases are reduced by 80 per cent, other vehicles (primarily locomotives) by 90 per cent,
other electrical goods and mineral oils by 40 per cent each. Finally, the 1963 and 1968
tables also contains a separate category for ‘other transport’, which includes the public
sector airlines, BEA and BOAC, and shipping expenditure in the British Rail accounts.75
On the arbitrary basis that the public sector in this category may account for less half of the
purchases made, and in order to create a downward bias in the results for later years, this
category has been excluded. Including this category for 1963 would only make a significant
impact on purchases from the mineral oil refining industry, which would be increased to 32
per cent. However, for 1968 purchases from the aerospace, shipbuilding and marine
engineering, and finally coke ovens and manufactured fuel industries would all increase to
98 60, and 26 per cent respectively.
Unfortunately, imports of goods and services are treated differently in the 1948
tables compared to 1963 and 1968.  In the 1948 tables competitive imports were presented
separately from the sector producing the respective commodity, whereas they were
allocated directly into the industry’s sales for the 1963 and 1968 tables. Table A1 & A2
demonstrates the differing ways in which imports were included
Table A1 Input-Output Table for 1948 a
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Intermediate
output £m
Final Goods £m Fixed capital
formation
£m
Imports
£m
Exports
£m
Total
Output £m
Public Private
Commodity
Input groups
1-47
9,566 2,403 6,885 1,730 -1,415 1,973 21,141
Total Goods &
Services b
18,879 3,241 8,377 1,730 -1,415 1,973 32,783
Notes: a totals may not add due to rounding: b Totals goods and services includes wages
and salaries, gross surplus , and taxes on expenditure less subsidies
Sources: Stewart, ‘Input-Output’, p.viii
Table A2 Input-Output Table for 1968 a
Intermediate
output £m
Final Goods £m Fixed capital
formation £m
Exports
£m
Total
Output £M
Public
(- imports)
Private
Commodity
Input groups
1-90
20,748 4,949 18,645 7,736 8,211 60,287
Imports 5,662 566 1,793 679 471 9,171
Total Goods &
Services b
61,969 12,463 27,245 8,231 8,799 118,706
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Notes: a totals may not add due to rounding: b Totals goods and services includes public
administration, domestic services and ownership of dwellings, wages and salaries, gross
profits, income from employment and taxes on expenditure less subsidies
Sources: Input-output 1968, tabs. D & P.
The differing treatment of imports means that total industry output for 1948 refers
to domestic industry’s output only whereas for 1963 and 1968 each industry's output is
inflated by the inclusion of imported goods. Second, purchases from each industry in 1948
do not distinguish between government purchases from domestic producers and purchases
of imported goods, whereas the 1963 and 1968 tables make these distinctions.76 It is not
possible to standardise imports between these two accounting approaches. The result of
this difference in the treatment of imports is that in 1948 government purchases are
increased as a proportion of total output while for 1963 and 1968 government purchases
are reduced as a proportion of total output. This is not, however, considered to be of
significance for two reasons. Imports in 1948 were still highly constrained by dollar
shortages and government controls. Second any upward bias in the 1948 results or
downward bias in the 1963 and 1968 results acts against the point this study is trying to
make, namely, that the public sector was of increasing importance as a factor in sales for
private firms.
To examine increases in capital formation table 7 relies upon the broader
categorisation of capital investment made within National Income and Expenditure Tables,
between vehicles, ships and aircraft, plant and machinery, and construction (dwellings and
other new buildings and works combined).
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